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Product availability impacts many industries such as transportation, events, and retail, yet little empirical
evidence documents the importance of stocking decisions for firm profits, vertical relationships, or
consumers. We conduct several experiments, exogenously removing top-selling products from a set
of vending machines and analyzing substitution patterns and profit impacts of the changed product
availability using nonparametric analyses and structural demand estimation. We find substantial switching
to alternate products, and evidence of misaligned incentives between upstream and downstream firms
in the choice of which products to carry. We discuss the trade-offs of both empirical approaches for
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Product mix and availability impact demand and cost considerations in many markets, par-
ticularly those for which storage costs or capacity constraints matter. For example, the choice
of product mix, stocking levels, product placement, and shelf-space coverage impact almost
all retail markets; transportation and performance event industries face critical decisions
about capacity and mix of seating types; and capacity decisions also impact the provision
of health care and school choice. Firms in these markets may optimize over product mix
and availability to inﬂuence consumer decisions about where to shop and when to make
purchasing decisions. In vertically-separated markets, optimal product and stocking choices
for downstream ﬁrms may diﬀer substantially from those of the competing manufacturers
whose products the downstream ﬁrms carry. In such settings, manufacturers tend to produce
a wide array of product varieties and to use vertical arrangements to try to align the stocking
decisions of the downstream ﬁrms with their own interests.
Despite the key role that product availability can play in many markets, little empir-
ical evidence exists on the importance of product availability for ﬁrm proﬁts or consumer
choices. We address this question by running a series of ﬁeld experiments in which top-selling
products are randomly removed for a period of time, and subsequent consumer responses
and proﬁt impacts are tracked. The experimental nature of these data allows us to analyze
the substitution patterns and proﬁt impacts using two alternative methodologies. First, we
report nonparametric analyses of the data using techniques common to the treatment-eﬀects
literature, and applicable here due to the exogenous variation in product availability intro-
duced by the experiments. Second, we analyze the data using structural demand estimation.
In our data, most consumers purchase another good when the top-selling products are re-
moved, and we describe the set of top substitutes for each experiment. The proﬁt impacts
of the product removals provide evidence that product availability is indeed an important
consideration for ﬁrms, and that stocking incentives may be misaligned between downstream
and upstream ﬁrms: some product removals result in lower revenues for upstream manufac-
turers but higher proﬁts for the downstream ﬁrm when consumers substitute to products
with lower wholesale costs. In addition, our construction of the experimental data, and the
implementation of alternative estimation methodologies allow us to generate insights into
the relative beneﬁts and drawbacks of applying these alternative methodological approaches
to other data sources or in other settings.
We run each ﬁeld experiment on a group of 60 vending machines located in ﬁve oﬃce
buildings in downtown Chicago. Over the course of a three-year period, we run six experi-
ments for roughly 2-3 weeks each, in which a single product is removed from all sites, and
two experiments in which two products are removed simultaneously. For the nonparametric
analyses, we choose control weeks from the three-year panel using nearest-neighbor match-
ing methods and report the substitution patterns implied by a comparison of the treatment
and control weeks. Using the same control weeks, we also report the proﬁt impacts of each
experiment for the downstream ﬁrm and the revenue impacts for all upstream ﬁrms. The
proﬁt impacts are interesting because they provide direct evidence on the diﬃculties that
ﬁrms face in aligning incentives in the vertical supply chain, and their incentives for vertical
1contracting. For example, in one experiment, the downstream ﬁrm proﬁts from the product
removal because substitute goods sell for the same price but are purchased by the vending
operator at lower wholesale costs.
The nonparametric approach allows us to document substitution patterns and proﬁt
impacts directly, with no need to make any parametric assumptions about the functional
form of demand. Indeed, the overall substitution patterns that we document are quite
sensible. However, the true eﬀect of each product removal is measured with error, which
occasionally results in noisy outcomes. For example, total vends are occasionally higher
during the treatment period (when a product is removed) than during the control period,
and vends of substitute goods are sometimes lower during the treatment period than in the
control. We would not want to assign a causal interpretation to these types of outcomes, and
thus, they represent a limitation to the otherwise very informative results of this approach.
More broadly, these sorts of problems may be endemic to any large-scale ﬁeld experiments
in industrial organization (IO). Unlike studies of individual behavior in the lab or the ﬁeld,
randomization may not be able to control for all possible market-level variables in most IO
contexts. For example, we can’t prevent Mars, Inc. from advertising Snickers in diﬀerent
ways over time or in diﬀerent geographic markets.
The second way in which we analyze the substitution patterns and proﬁt impacts of
changes in product availability is through the use of structural demand estimation. Using
the full dataset, we estimate nested logit and random-coeﬃcients logit models of demand.
We predict vends during the treatment and control periods using the estimated model pa-
rameters, and compare these outcomes. The models perform well in many respects, and
capture much of the variation that is observed in the nonparametric results. However, they
tend to underpredict sales to the products identiﬁed as ‘top’ substitutes in the nonparametric
analysis, and overpredict sales to other products. We speculate on two reasons for this result;
namely, properties of the logit error term, and the endogeneity of changes in the retailer’s
product mix. We also provide estimates of downstream proﬁt and upstream revenue, and
again ﬁnd evidence of mismatched incentives in the vertical supply chain.
Next, we extend the structural analyses by simulating the eﬀect of the product removal
directly. This diﬀers from the ﬁrst exercise, in which we compare estimates of the model
during the treatment and control periods, because that exercise allows for other changes to
occur in addition to the stock-out of the focal product. For example, if a diﬀerent brand of
pretzels was carried during a control week, the ﬁrst exercise adjusts for that. In this sense,
neither the experiments nor the predicted structural estimates of vends during the treatment
and control periods provide a perfectly clean measure of the impact of the product removal
per se. Simulating the product removal, on the other hand, holds all other factors ﬁxed, and
isolates the “pure” treatment eﬀect when the model is correctly speciﬁed. The results of
simulating the product removal reveal sensible substitution patterns, although the “spread”
across available substitutes is qualitatively similar to the ﬁrst, ‘prediction’ exercise. The
proﬁt/revenue impacts for downstream/upstream ﬁrms are quite similar to the impacts we
estimate using the nonparametric approach. Speciﬁcally, the simulations identify the same
instances of mismatched incentives in the vertical chain that the nonparametric approach
2identiﬁes.
In most cases in which one estimates demand, the type of exogenous variation in product
availability that we create through our experiments does not exist in the data. Thus, struc-
tural demand models are often identiﬁed solely from naturally-occurring variation in choice
sets (which may also include variation in product characteristics, such as price). One way
to examine how successful these sources of variation are for identifying model parameters
is to remove the variation in choice sets that arises from our experimental interventions.
Thus, we conduct a series of hold-out analyses, in which we estimate the nested logit and
random-coeﬃcients logit models using subsets of the data that drop treatment periods.1 We
ﬁnd that the estimated model parameters are generally robust to the exclusion of data from
the experimental interventions, with the exception of the parameters that govern correlation
in consumer tastes for candy and sugar. These parameters are sensitive to the exclusion of
data from the candy bar stock outs. The ﬁnding is intuitive because the candy bars removed
in our experiments have much higher market shares than the salty snack and cookie products
that were exogenously removed, and there are fewer “naturally occurring” changes over time
in the product mix of the candy category.
There are several advantages to studying product availability in the context of vending
machines. One advantage is the ability to successfully implement the ﬁeld experiments
logistically (ie., to exogenously change the set of products that are available to consumers).
Even a “simple” retail setting would introduce complications to this change that are absent
with vending machines.2 Second, the scale of revenues that are potentially at stake in a
vending machine is relatively small, so the experiments are not prohibitively expensive to
run. Third, we observe the wholesale costs of the vending operator, which makes calculation
of the upstream and downstream revenue/proﬁt impacts possible.
Some features of vending machines are both advantages and disadvantages for the purpose
of our study. Competition between retail outlets is not a feature of our setting. While this
simpliﬁes many aspects of the study, it is also a limitation, in the sense that we cannot
study how competition among downstream ﬁrms responds to changes in product availability.
Similarly, price variation is quite limited, especially within a site for a category (e.g., candy)
over a period of time.
Finally, we note that the ﬁeld experiments that were implemented in this work are not
randomized trials. Rather, each experiment is an intervention in which we exogenously vary
the set of products available to all consumers for a period of time, and control weeks are
selected from an observational dataset during which no intervention occurred.3 We did not
1One could describe the baseline estimates from our full dataset as an “in-sample” prediction exercise for
the structural models. The hold-out analyses provide an “out-of-sample” prediction, in which the model is
asked to predict the results of experiments that have not already occurred in the data.
2For example, one would need to remove the focal product not only from shelves, but also from back-room
storage areas, or alternatively prevent clerks from responding to special consumer requests to retrieve an
item from storage when it is not on the shelf.
3From the point of view of experimental economics, our intervention is more closely related to laboratory
experiments that attempt to understand markets as a whole (e.g. Smith (1962) and more recently, Eriv and
Roth (1998), among others), than to experiments that examine individual responses (Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) summarize many examples). Despite the fact that such interventions fall short of a fully randomized
3have the ability to randomize the set of products oﬀered to any given consumer at the time
of her purchase. Such an experiment would represent a true randomized trial (absent other
market-level eﬀects), but is not feasible technologically in brick-and-morter retail contexts.
Relationship to Literature
This paper connects several diﬀerent literatures. The ﬁrst is a growing literature in
economics, marketing, and operations research that focuses on ﬁrms’ stocking decisions and
the importance of product availability to consumers. Like us, Anupindi, Dada, and Gupta
(1998) also study product availability in the context of vending machines. Several examples
in this literature focus on scanner data and availability at supermarkets and convenience
stores, such as Bruno and Vilcassim (2008), and Musalem, Olivares, Bradlow, Terwiesch,
and Corsten (2010), and Matsa (2010). Aguirregabiria (1999) also uses scanner data to
examine the strategic implications of dynamic inventory decisions in the context of vertical
markets.
The second is a wider literature on ﬁeld experiments in economics. A rather extensive
review of this literature is presented in Levitt and List (2009). Some recent and notable
examples include Karlan and List (2007) who study the impact of price on charitable giving,
and Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shaﬁr, and Zinman (2010) who examine the impact
of advertising using a direct-mail experiment involving consumer lending. Much of the ﬁeld
experiments literature focuses on direct-mail, charitable giving, or auction settings (such as
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, List, and Reiley (2005) or Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009)). In a retail
setting Cai, Fang, and Yuyu (2009) examine observational learning by randomly marking
menu items as “favorites” and analyzing the impact of the designation on customer demand.
There is a small related literature that uses experiments to study the eﬀects of stockouts.
Fitzsimons (2000) studies psychological eﬀects of stockouts on consumers in the laboratory,
and Anderson, Fitzsimons, and Simester (2006) examine psychological framing eﬀects of how
stockouts are presented to consumers in the context of a mail-order company.
The paper also contributes to a recent discussion about the role of diﬀerent methods in
empirical work going back to Leamer (1983), and discussed recently by Heckman (2010),
Angrist and Pischke (2010), Leamer (2010), Keane (2010), Sims (2010), Nevo and Whinston
(2010), Stock (2010), and Einav and Levin (2010). A central issue in this debate is what role
experimental or quasi-experimental methods should play in empirical economic analyses in
contrast to structural methods. Several of these recent papers essentially argue that both
types of approaches have advantages and drawbacks. Our setting provides the opportunity
to examine empirically the trade-oﬀs to which these papers refer. For example, while our
experimental estimates are quite informative in many respects, there are cases in which we
would not want to infer causality (e.g., when overall sales increase during a stock-out event).
The structural demand models use economic theory to rule out such an eﬀect, but cannot
fully capture the degree of substitution that occurs from a focal product to other goods. This
is especially true when a product’s most important characteristics are less easy to measure
trial, they are in fact exactly the type of experimentation that one might expect retailers to do when trying
to learn about demand or set prices in an optimal way. Online retailers may diﬀer from brick-and-morter
stores in this respect, but the nature of competition and consumer search may also diﬀer in online settings.
4(e.g., packaging diﬀerences, or possibly unobserved advertising campaigns).
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the design of our ﬁeld experiments and
data collection in section 2. Section 3 describes the non-parametric results from the ﬁeld
experiments including the implications of the experimental results for ﬁrm proﬁtability. In
section 4, we describe two structural demand models commonly used to estimate substitution
patterns (i.e., nested-logit and random-coeﬃcients logit models), and a method for estimating
the rate of consumer arrivals at each machine. In section 5 we compare the predicted
substitution patterns of those models during the treatment and control weeks analyzed in
section 3; section 6 uses the demand models to simulate the removal of focal products (holding
all other conditions of the market ﬁxed). Section 7 provides the results of hold-out analyses,
in which we estimate the demand model on subsets of the data, and section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Data Collection
2.1 The Vending Industry
The U.S. vending industry generates 41 billion dollars annually. Product availability in
the context of vending has been the subject of many recent debates about obesity and
the appropriate public policy response to the mix of products oﬀered in vending machines,
particularly in school settings. Forty states now tax junk food or soda products, and cities,
school districts, and other local jurisdictions have proposed or implemented restrictions on
the set of products that may be oﬀered in vending machines.4
Most vending operators are small independent ﬁrms that purchase inputs directly from
manufacturers and wholesalers. Some manufacturing ﬁrms vertically integrate down into
vending activities–particularly for beverages at school locations–but this is the exception to
the rule of vertical separation in the industry. A number of vertical arrangements are used
in the industry. Most notable among these are “rebate programs” in which manufacturers
pay rebates to vending operators.5
2.2 Experimental Design
We ran eight separate ﬁeld experiments with the help of Mark Vend Company, which is a
medium-sized independent vending operator in the Chicago area. We identiﬁed 60 snack
4See Engber (2009) for a recent press article summarizing many policy responses in this area. More
recent examples include rules requiring that the mix of beverages in city vending machines favor water in
New York City, a ban on sales of sugary drinks in city buildings in San Francisco, and a similar proposed
ban in Boston (Smith 2010). The medical literature has also weighed in on the issue of taxing sugary drinks
(e.g., see Brownell and Frieden (2009) and Brownell, Farley, Willett, Popkin, Chaloupka, Thompson, and
Ludwig (2009)).
5Rebates are generally based on two possible criteria. The ﬁrst is sales levels: sales of a particular
manufacturer’s products must be maintained or increased from year-ago levels. The second is product
facings: the operator must carry a certain number of a manufacturer’s products in all of his machines. The
terms of rebate programs are not well publicized.
5machines located in oﬃce buildings, for which demand was historically quite stable.6 Most
of the customers at these sites are ‘white-collar’ employees of law ﬁrms and insurance com-
panies. Our goal in selecting the machines was to choose machines that could be analyzed
together, in order to be able to run each experiment over a shorter period of time across more
machines.7 We selected snack machines because beverage machines have extremely large ca-
pacities and a small number of products. This made the logistics of stocking out beverages
more diﬃcult (removing and storing 100 large heavy bottles vs. 20 candy bars), and also
made the outcomes less interesting, because the demand system only includes around six
products. Finally, we selected machines on routes that were staﬀed by experienced drivers,
so that the implementation of the experiments would be successful. The 60 machines used
for each experiment were distributed across ﬁve of Mark Vend’s clients, which had between
3 and 21 machines each. The largest client had two sets of ﬂoors serviced on diﬀerent days,
and we divided this client into two sites. Generally, each site is spread across multiple ﬂoors
in a single high-rise oﬃce building, with machines located on each ﬂoor.
Implementation of the experiments was fairly straightforward. For each experiment, we
removed either one or two top-selling products from all machines for a period of roughly 2.5
to 3 weeks. Six of the experiments stocked-out a single top-selling product: Snickers, Peanut
M&Ms, Zoo Animal Crackers, Famous Amos Chocolate Chip cookies, Doritos, or Cheetos.
Two of the experiments removed two products simultaneously: Snickers plus Peanut M&Ms,
or Doritos plus Cheetos. Whenever a product was experimentally stocked-out, poster-card
announcements were placed at the front of the empty product column. The announcements
read “This product is temporarily unavailable. We apologize for any inconvenience.” The
purpose of the card was two-fold: ﬁrst, we wanted to avoid dynamic eﬀects on sales as much
as possible, and second, the ﬁrm wanted to minimize the number of phone calls received in
response to the stock-out events.
The dates of the experiments range from June 2007 to September 2008, with all exper-
iments run during the months of May - October. We collected data for all machines for
just over three years, from January of 2006 until February of 2009. During each 2-3 week
experimental period, most machines receive service visits about three times. However, the
length of service visits varies across machines, with some machines visited more frequently
than others.
The cost of the experiments consisted primarily of driver costs. Drivers had to spend
extra time removing and reintroducing products to machines, and the driver dispatcher had
to spend time instructing the drivers, tracking the dates of each experiment, and reviewing
the data as they were collected. Drivers are generally paid a small commission on the
sales on their routes, so if sales levels fell dramatically as a result of the experiments, their
commissions could be aﬀected. Tracking commissions and extra minutes on each route for
each driver would have been prohibitively expensive to do, and so drivers were provided
6More precisely, demand at these sites is “relatively” stable compared to the population of sites serviced
by the vending operator.
7Many high-volume machines are located in public areas (e.g., museums or hospitals), and have demand
that varies enormously from one day to the next, so we did not use machines of this nature. In contrast, the
work-force populations at our experimental sites are relatively homogenous.
6with $25 gift cards for gasoline during each week in which an experiment was active on their
route to compensate them for the extra time and the potential for lower commissions. With
the exception of an individual site on each of two experimental runs, implementation was
successful.8
We faced a few limitations when designing these experiments. For example, several
experiments were run “back-to-back.” In these cases, we selected products that seemed
ex-ante less likely to be close substitutes for adjacent runs. For example, the Doritos stock-
out was followed by the Peanut M&Ms stockout. Due to more diﬃcult logistics associated
with experimental price changes, we were not able to implement any pricing experiments.9
Finally, throughout our analyses, we focus on static eﬀects. We do not see much evidence
of dynamic eﬀects in the data, but this is not something for which we are able to test
directly. We note that demand for a focal product remains fairly stable (and demand for
other products returns to previous levels) after its experiment ends, except where it may be
a substitute for a subsequent experiment.
2.3 Data Description
Data on the number and price of all products vended are recorded internally at each vending
machine used in our experiments. The data track vends and revenues since the last service
visit (but do not include time-stamps for each sale). Any given machine can carry roughly 35
products at one time, depending on conﬁguration. We observe prices and variable costs for
each product at each service visit during our 38-month panel. There is relatively little price
variation within a site, and almost no price variation within a category (e.g., candy) at a site.
Very few “natural” stock-outs occur at our set of machines.10 Over all sites and months, we
observe 162 unique manufacturer products. We organize these products into 417 site-product
pairs (approximately 70 unique manufacturer products per site) by consolidating low-selling
products over time within each site.11 This set of 417 site-product pairs is our base dataset
for all analyses and estimation.
In addition to the data from Mark Vend, we also collect data on the characteristics of
each product online and through industry trade sources.12 For each product, we note its
manufacturer, as well as the following set of product characteristics: package size, number
of servings, and nutritional information.13 One variable that the data do not measure is the
8In the two unsuccessful runs, the driver at one site forgot to remove the focal product, so no intervention
took place.
9The ﬁrm does change some prices at some sites late in the dataset; we do not analyze this variation.
10Mark Vend commits to a low level of stock-out events in its service contracts.
11For example, we combine Milky Way Midnight with Milky Way. In a small number of cases, the
consolidated products vary slightly in their wholesale costs or combine products of diﬀerent manufacturers.
For these products, we use the modal wholesale cost, and we apportion revenues paid by the vending operator
to manufacturers on the basis of the vends of each individual product.
12For consolidated products, we collect data on product characteristics at the disaggregated level. The
characteristics of the consolidated product are computed as the weighted average of the characteristics of
the component products, using vends to weight. In many cases, the observable characteristics are identical.
13Nutritional information includes weight, calories, fat calories, sodium, ﬁber, sugars, protein, carbohy-
7number of people who walk away from a machine. We considered the possibility of adding
video cameras or pressure mats to the machines, but neither of these options would have
provided clean information on market size.14 We discuss the issue of market size in detail
when we describe the structural models of demand.
Table 1 provides summary statistics by manufacturer. The six major snack manufacturers
are listed separately, followed by a column for all minor manufacturers.15 In the ﬁrst two
panels, we report statistics for each manufacturer’s full portfolio of products: the inside-good
market share, average daily sales per machine, average number of products per machine, and
product counts by category. PepsiCo produces the largest number of products (30), with
the largest inside market share (over 33%).16 The smallest major manufacturer is Kraft,
producing 8 products with an inside market share of about 3%. Minor manufacturers account
for just over 0.9% of all vends each (15.9% combined), spread across 40 products. The average
number of products per machine ranges from 1.6 (out of 8) for Kraft to nearly 11 (out of 30)
for PepsiCo. The average daily sales per machine is higher for the major manufacturers than
for minor manufacturers. The total number of products carried per machine for all minor
manufacturers combined is 1.2 on average. Major manufacturers segment across diﬀerent
product categories, with Mars and Hershey’s focusing on chocolate and candy, PepsiCo and
Snyder’s focusing on salty snacks, and Kellogg and Kraft in the cookie and energy categories.
Maximum, minimum and median retail and wholesale prices are listed in the second
panel of table 1. The largest spread in prices exists among the combined minor manufac-
turers. In the last panel, we report retail and wholesale prices and the average inside good
share for the “best,” “median,” and “worst” products, deﬁned as the products with the
highest/median/lowest average daily sales rate in our three-year sample period. The range
of inside good shares is very similar for major and minor manufacturers. Neither retail nor
wholesale prices are correlated with sales performance.
3 Nonparametric Analyses of the Experimental Outcomes
In order to calculate the substitution patterns implied by the experiments, sales during
treatment (ie., stock-out) weeks are compared with sales during control weeks. We measure
substitution from product k to product j as:
∆qj = E[qj|AJ\k] − E[qj|AJ]
drates, and cholesterol.
14Pressure mats were not workable because potential customers can see the product facings without stand-
ing close enough to be registered on the mat. Video cameras would have introduced issues of human subjects
approval into the experiments, and also suﬀer from the problem of consumers being able to see the product
facings in some machines without standing close enough to show up on the video.
15We classify 17 manufacturers as ‘minor’ manufacturers based on the availability and sales of their prod-
ucts at the six experimental sites. These are: Barton’s Confectioners, Biscomerica, Brother’s Kane, Califor-
nia Chips, ConAgra, Farley’s & Sathers Candy Company, Frontera Foods, General Mills, Genisoy, Inventure
Group, Just Born Inc., Kar’s Nuts, Nestle, Procter & Gamble, Sherwood Brands, Snak King, and United
Natural Foods.
16All Frito-Lay and Quaker brands are owned by PepsiCo.
8where qj denotes weekly sales, J is the full set of products, and AJ denotes availability of all
products in J.
In principle, this calculation is straightforward. In practice, however, there are three
challenges in implementing the experiments and interpreting the data generated by them.
First, service visits vary in length across machines and over time. Second, overall sales levels
vary over time, due to exogenous changes in the rate of consumer arrivals. For example,
a law ﬁrm may have a large case going to trial in a given month, and vend levels will
increase at the ﬁrm during that period. Third, the product mix presented in a machine is
not necessarily ﬁxed across machines, or within a machine over long periods of time (e.g.,
as manufacturers change their product lines, or Mark Vend changes stocking decisions).
Variation in the product mix across sites and machines increases the number of outcomes
that the experiment attempts to measure (consider that we start with 162 unique products,
roughly 70 of which are carried at any particular site).17 Changes in the product mix that
occur over time for a given machine aﬀect the comparability of the observational control
weeks to the weeks in which treatment occurs.
We take three steps to address these complicating factors. First, we consolidate data
collected at service visits to weekly observations. This allows us to make direct comparisons
across machines that are visited at diﬀerent frequencies.18 Second, we create classes of
products for reporting the results of the experiments. This reduces the number of outcomes
that each experiment attempts to measure. Third, we select a set of matched control weeks
using nearest-neighbor matching techniques. This adjusts for the fact that the treatment
weeks may belong to periods of low or high demand, due to exogenous variation in market
size over time. We describe each of these steps in turn.
The ﬁrst step for analyzing the experimental outcomes is the assignment of sales data
to weekly units. This is done by apportioning “total vends since the previous visit” evenly
across the elapsed days, and gathering groups of seven days into weeks.19 Moving to weekly
visits has a number of advantages. It smooths out variation in sales levels that occurs over
very short (daily) intervals, and makes data from diﬀerent service visits comparable.20 Ex-
periments are implemented at service visits, and all data from the experiments are also
apportioned to weeks. This introduces the possibility that an experiment may be “contam-
inated” at the weekly level because implementation of the stock-out occurred in the middle
of a week. In order to minimize this contamination, we choose start-dates for weeks at each
site based on the timing of the experimental stock-out service visit.21 This eliminates con-
17Recall that a single machine may be able to stock roughly 35 diﬀerent products at one time, depending
on conﬁguration.
18When we estimate models of demand in later sections, we preserve the visit-level detail for estimation,
but report predictions and simulations of the model at the weekly level.
19On average across the entire dataset, service visits are approximately 2 days long. However, the time
between service visits ranges from one to 21 days. The length of time between visits varies over time for a
given machine, and also across machines (and sites).
20Daily vends would also provide comparable results, but with a signiﬁcant amount of noise in overall
levels of vends.
21For example, if Snickers bars were removed on a Wednesday at site 93, we deﬁne weeks as periods
of Wednesday - Tuesday at that site. We set the start-date of weeks separately for each site and each
9tamination, except for a very small number of cases in which diﬀerent machines within a
site are visited on diﬀerent days. In such cases, we eliminate any treatment weeks for which
more than four vends of the focal product were recorded at the site.
The second step we take for the analysis is to create product “classes” by combining
the roughly 70 products at each site into groupings for which substitution can be reliably
measured. This is necessary because smaller products are not bought in suﬃcient quantity
to identify substitution eﬀects to each one individually.22 We allow the product classes to
vary by experiment: all experiments include the six focal products, four additional major
products (Twix Caramel, Salted Peanuts, Raisinets, and Skittles), and seven “assorted”
classes to capture the smallest products. We choose several additional individual products
to track for each experiment based on the substitution patterns observed in the data.23
The third step is to select matched control weeks from the three-year panel of observa-
tional data. Before selecting control weeks, we sum vends across the machines at a given
site.24 Levels of demand at a site that change over time aﬀect our ability to compare sales
during treatment and control periods, and the selection of matched control weeks focuses on
choosing weeks in which the level of demand is similar to that during the relevant treatment
period. In our particular setting, many of the experiments were run during the summer
of 2007, which was a high-point in demand at these sites, most likely due to macroeco-
nomic conditions. In order to select weeks of similar demand levels, we identify a set of
product classes that we believe are ex-ante unlikely to be substitutes to the focal product,
and we use nearest-neighbor matching methods, matching on the site-level sales of these
“non-substitute” product classes.
The use of matching on non-substitute product classes may be motivated in the following
way. Substitution from product k to product j in market t is described as the change in the
probability of purchasing j when k is not available. Excluding cases in which products are
complementary in consumption, this implies that
pjt(AJ\k) > pjt(AJ).
In the data, we observe sales rather than choice probabilities, given by:
qjt = Mtpjt(At),
experiment, and require that each week start on a workday (Monday - Friday).
22Fig Newton and Swiss Creme cookies are examples of these types of products. The stocking of these
products is sometimes governed by the client (e.g., the CEO may request that Fig Newtons be available).
23The assorted classes are: Chocolate, Candy, Energy, Cookie, Potato Chips, Pretzels, and Salty Snacks.
As an example of how the additional individual products vary across experiments, consider the Snickers and
Cheetos removals. When stocking out Snickers, the additional individual products are Ruger Vanilla Wafer
and Grandma’s Chocolate Chip Cookie. For the Cheetos stock-out, the additional individual products are
Sun Chips, Frito, Farley’s Mixed Fruit, Cheez-It Original, and Hot Stuﬀ Jays.
24There is nothing to be gained in the nonparametric analysis from variation across diﬀerent machines at
the same oﬃce building, given that our experiment removes each focal product from all machines at the site
at the same time.
10where At denotes the set of available products in market t, and Mt denotes market size.25
The challenge for identifying substitution is that Mt is unobserved. The matching procedure
attempts to control for changes in Mt by matching on sales levels of non-substitute products.









so that by matching on sales levels of the non-substitute goods, we try to obtain a ratio of
Mt0/Mt that is close to one.26
Matching is done within each site. For each treatment week we select the four closest
control weeks based on sales of the non-substitute product classes.27 The set of products
that were used for matching are shown in table 2. We grouped the salty snack experiments
together, and the candy and Chocolate Chip Famous Amos experiments together for deﬁning
sets of products for matching.28 Diﬀerent sites used diﬀerent subsets of products on which
to match, due to changes in availability or the product mix of these classes at particular
sites.
These three steps enable us to examine the results of each experiment. Note that for each
experiment, we have one outcome for each non-focal product class at a site. Matching esti-
25A market in our context generally has both geographic and temporal characteristics (ie., the week of
March 4th at site 93).
26We investigated a number of alternative approaches. For example, we analyzed a “diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence” type estimator in which, instead of matching the treatment week to a set of control weeks,
one matches the week before an experiment to potential control weeks on the basis of focal-product sales
and calculates changes in vends over time. This avoids the problem of having to choose products on which
to match based on ex-ante notions of substitutability. In practice, however, week-to-week (or visit-to-visit)
variation is quite noisy, and this resulted in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators that primarily captured ran-
dom week-to-week ﬂuctuations. We also ran all analyses using a set of “admissible” control weeks that
were identiﬁed on the basis of a site’s product mix during the experimental period. In this method, we
admitted control weeks for which each product carried at a site during the experimental weeks was available
in at least 80 percent of the machines at each site. This method yielded qualitatively similar results to the
matching estimates that we report, but resulted in more experiments for which total vends increased when
a product was removed. We report the nearest-neighbor matching estimator (using non-substitute products
as the matching variables) as our baseline estimates because the statistical properties of these estimators
are well understood. (See Abadie and Imbens (2006).) In contrast, admitting control weeks on the basis
of a non-linear function of a vector of availability dummies for a set of products is (to us) less well under-
stood. Finally, we also ran all analyses using the full control set of approximately 120 weeks. The matched
estimators perform signiﬁcantly better, particularly with respect to levels of total vends.
27All estimates were also run using ten matched control weeks for each treatment week; results were
qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates reported here for four matches.
28The Chocolate Chip Famous Amos cookie experiment was grouped with the candy experiments because
of the presence of chocolate. The set of products for matching in the Zoo Animal Cracker experiment was
allowed to diﬀer from the candy and Famous Amos experiments because the vending operator identiﬁed that
product ex-ante as potentially having a diﬀerent set of substitute products.
11mators are usually discussed in the context of a single outcome of interest, such as in Lalonde
(1986), or Dehejia and Wahba (1999).29 In our context, the “average treatment eﬀect” is a
vector of outcomes because we have multiple outcomes of interest. Our approach, therefore,
is to use the matching methods developed in the treatment eﬀects literature to generate
matched observations.30 We then use this matched sample to report mean outcomes for all
products for the treatment and control weeks, along with the percentile of the distribution of
all control outcomes to which the mean results relate. Thus, we measure substitution from
product k to product j as:
∆qj = Ei[qij|AJ\k,Ti = 1] − Ei[qij|AJ,Ti = 0,Ni ≤ 4]
where expectations are taken over weeks, indexed by i, and J denotes the full set of product
classes. The variable Ti is an indicator variable denoting whether week i belongs to the
treatment period in which product k was exogenous removed, and Ni is the distance rank
of each potential control week produced by the matching procedure.31 We also estimate the
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where sj denotes the inside market share of product j.
We estimate outcomes for each site and each experiment, which generates a set of 48
tables of outcomes (six sites times eight experiments). In order to capture the overall eﬀect
of an experiment, we sum over the average weekly rates at each site during the treatment
and control periods, and compute the diﬀerence, as well as the percentile of the distribution
of vends at all sites to which the rate corresponds.32 This adds eight more tables to the set
of results.
29Abadie and Imbens (2006) work out the large sample properties of matching estimators for average
treatment eﬀects in this context, and Imbens (2004) provides a review of this literature.
30We use the nnmatch command in Stata, described in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004), and
choose the Mahalanobis metric for measuring the distance between the treatment and control vectors of
covariates.
31Thus, we denote the closest match as having rank Ni = 1, so that Ni ≤ 4 selects the four nearest
neighbors using the method in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004).
32Note, this essentially weights the contribution of each site to the total impact of the experiment by its
overall sales level. Diﬀerent sites may run a particular experiment for shorter or longer periods relative to
other sites. For example, one site may stock out a product for two weeks, while another stocks out the
product for three weeks. An alternative weighting across sites would be to sum all vends together and then
compute weekly rates. This would weight the average based on both sales levels at each site and the number
of weeks for which a site ran a particular experiment. We prefer weighting by site because the length of time
for a given experiment at a given site varies for unhelpful reasons. For example, slower sites may be visited
less often and have longer runs but lower weekly sales.
123.1 Substitution Patterns
Table 3 reports results from one of the 56 tables–namely, the overall substitution patterns
(summed over sites) of the Snickers removal.33 The top panel of the table reports vends, and
the bottom panel reports inside market shares. The ﬁrst column in each table reports average
weekly vends for the matched control weeks. The second column reports the percentile at
which the mean of the matched control weeks falls relative to the full distribution of sales
for all control weeks.34 The third column reports average total vends for the treatment
weeks, and the fourth column reports the percentile of the distribution of sales for all control
weeks with which the treatment outcome is associated. If a product’s average total weekly
sales during the treatment weeks exceeds total weekly sales for all control weeks, we report
the 100th percentile. The ﬁfth column reports the diﬀerence in the two means, and the
last column reports the percentage increase in sales for the substitute good. For example,
during the Snickers experiment, table 3 shows that Peanut M&Ms sold 118.4 more units in
an average treatment week; its mean total weekly sales during the control period were 359.9,
and the percentage increase was 32.9. Sales of Peanut M&Ms in the matched control sample
exceeded sales in 73.6% of all control weeks, and the average treatment outcome of 478.3
sales exceeded sales in 99% of all control weeks. The magnitudes of the percentile changes
among the top substitutes are quite striking across all experiments, and it is common to see
very large changes in sales percentiles between treatment and control periods for the top
products.
Table 3 also shows that total vends during the matched control (treatment) period corre-
spond to the 74th (73rd) percentile of the overall distribution of total vends. Overall, total
vends are only 0.1% lower during the treatment weeks when Snickers is removed. This likely
reﬂects at least two factors: ﬁrst, most consumers purchase another product when Snickers
is not available (as opposed to walking away), and second, demand was relatively high when
the Snickers experiment was run. The rows in both panels are sorted by the mean diﬀerence
in vends, so products toward the top of the list are those whose sales increased the most
when Snickers was removed. Sales of the top ﬁve products (Peanut M&Ms, Twix Caramel,
Assorted Chocolate, Assorted Energy, and Zoo Animal Cracker) increased by a total of 370
vends during the treatment period, which exceeds the average level of Snickers vends during
the matched control weeks of 323. The products with the largest percentage change are
found by examining the last column.35 Examining the lower panel of table 3 allows one to
normalize by overall sales levels by comparing changes in inside market shares.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results for all eight experiments. Table 4 reports the top
ﬁve substitutes for each focal product(s) based on level changes in sales summed across sites;
table 5 reports the top ﬁve substitutes for each focal product(s) based on percentage changes
33All 56 tables are available online in our online appendix. See the link for this paper at
http://mortimer.fas.harvard.edu.
34With no matching, most of these percentiles will be near 50%. The matched control weeks admits greater
variance across products in these percentiles.
35In the Snickers experiment, the top ﬁve products in terms of percentage changes are: Twix Caramel,
Peanut M&Ms, Ruger Vailla Wafer, Assorted Chocolate, and Zoo Animal Cracker.
13in sales. The last three rows in each panel report changes in the sales of: focal product(s),
top 5 substitutes, and total vends between the treatment and matched control weeks. For
all but one experiment (Peanut M&Ms), we observe a reduction in total vends during the
product removal. Substitution to the top ﬁve products exceeds the average number of vends
of the focal product during the matched control weeks in four experiments in table 4.36 The
fact that vends to the top ﬁve substitutes exceed the vends of the focal product in this
analysis implies that matching cannot fully control for changes in overall levels of demand
across treatment and control weeks.
3.2 Proﬁt Impacts
The proﬁtability of both the vending operator and upstream manufacturers may be impacted
by changes in availability. For the upstream manufacturer, we observe revenue, but not
production costs. We observe which products are co-owned by individual manufacturers, and
we can calculate the revenue impacts across manufacturers that result from each experiment.
In the case of Mark Vend Company, the downstream vending operator, we observe prices
and wholesale cost, so we can compute the total variable proﬁt for each week.37
Table 6 reports the weekly proﬁt impact of the Snickers removal for the downstream ﬁrm
at the level of individual product classes.38 Manufacturers are listed for each product class,
with assorted product classes noting multiple manufacturers. The ﬁrst column reports Mark
Vend’s margin; his margin for Snickers is 21 cents, and he loses $68.40 of variable proﬁt per
week on this product when it is removed. Sales of Assorted Salty Snacks are also down during
the treatment week, and he loses $51.60 of variable proﬁt per week from this product class.
He gains from other products: for example, increased sales of Peanut M&Ms contribute an
additional $25.20 in weekly proﬁt. Overall, total vends are down, but the net proﬁt impact
for Mark Vend is positive, with an increase in proﬁt of $2.60 per week. This is generated
in part by consumers’ willingness to substitute to other products when Snickers is removed
(rather than leaving empty-handed), and in part by the relatively low margin that Mark
Vend receives on vends of Snickers (e.g., $0.21 vs. $0.48 for Assorted Energy products).
Table 7 summarizes the total weekly proﬁt impact of each experiment for Mark Vend.
Two experiments (Snickers and Peanut M&Ms) result in a proﬁt increase for Mark Vend.39
Three experiments result in higher average margins for Mark Vend. The most striking
example of this eﬀect is seen for the double removal of Snickers and Peanut M&Ms, in which
36Table 5 reports changes in the inside market share of the top ﬁve substitutes based on percentage changes.
The combined change in the inside market shares of these ﬁve products exceeds the market share of the focal
product in three experiments.
37We also know some facts about the rebate programs in which Mark Vend participates. The programs
return between 8 and 18 percent of wholesale cost depending on the manufacturer; on average, MarkVend
receives rebates of around 10 percent of its wholesale cost. The numbers reported in the proﬁt tables do not
reﬂect these discounts.
38Products are listed in the same order as in table 3 (based on their increase in sales when Snickers is
removed). The full set of 56 proﬁt impact tables are provided in the online appendix.
39However, the Peanut M&Ms result diﬀers from the Snickers result because overall vends are higher
during the treatment weeks than the control weeks in this case.
14average margins increase by 1.2 cents per vend. The eﬀect of this increase in margin is that
Mark Vend loses only $15.00 per week from the removal of these two products, despite a
reduction in overall weekly sales levels of 218 units.
Table 8 reports the revenue impact of each experiment for all manufacturers. Revenues
to manufacturers are calculated as the wholesale cost paid by Mark Vend to the manufac-
turer, not including any potential rebate payments.40 Revenue impacts for the manufacturer
of the focal product of any given experiment are shown in bold typeface (e.g., Mars Inc.
manufactures Snickers). Minor manufacturers include all 17 manufacturers listed in table
1. In all but one case, the manufacturer of the focal product had lower revenues during the
treatment period in which its product was removed.41 The largest eﬀect was for Mars Inc.
during the joint stock-out of Snickers and Peanut M&Ms, for which its revenues declined by
$220.52 per week.42
4 Structural Models of Demand
In this section we describe two models of demand commonly used for analyzing markets for
diﬀerentiated products. Both models assume knowledge of market size, M. We ﬁrst describe
our method for determining market size, and then specify the structural demand models.
4.1 Calculating Market Size
Unlike many settings, in which market size is assumed to be constant over time, the number
of people considering a purchase from a vending machine may change signiﬁcantly from one
week to the next. For example, the employees at one site may have an important deadline
one week, which increases demand for vending products temporarily. Unfortunately, we do
not observe how many people pass by each vending machine in our sample in any given week
who are considering making a purchase.43 Thus, we estimate market size using data on total
vends over time at the machine level. Our baseline model speciﬁes market size on the basis
of the following regression:
yrv = ηrd + τrt + rv (1)
40When eligible, these payments would be made to Mark Vend by the manufacturer at the end of each
ﬁscal year.
41The exception is that PepsiCo’s revenues increase when Cheetos are removed. This is likely due to the
presence of week-to-week variation in relative market shares, market size, and the availability of products
in some of the Assorted classes that are not fully controlled for by the matching procedure. However, the
result may also partly reﬂect the fact that PepsiCo owns a very large fraction of the available substitute
salty snacks.
42One apparent puzzle in this table is the decline in revenues for Snyder’s, which did not have a focal
product in any of the experiments. This is due primarily to changes in the set of products that Mark
Vend stocked over time; particularly, the replacement of some of the Snyder pretzel products with products
manufactured by ‘Minor’ manufacturers and PepsiCo.
43This is more than a simple data limitation, in the sense that even additional data monitoring (e.g.,
pressure mats or video cameras on the machines) would not provide perfect information on how many
consumers may be considering making a purchase as opposed to simply being located near a vending machine.
15where yrv is ﬁve times total vends at visit v for machine r, ηrd is a full set of machine ×
day of week ﬁxed eﬀects (six for each machine), and τrt is a full set of machine×month×
year ﬁxed eﬀects (38 for each machine).44 We specify market size as the predicted value
ˆ yrv from this regression, with two additional restrictions.45 We investigated an alternative
speciﬁcation for market size and ran all prediction exercises using the alternative estimate.
The results were qualitatively the same as our baseline estimates.46
4.2 Nested Logit and Random-coeﬃcients Logit Speciﬁcations
We specify two models of demand: nested logit and random-coeﬃcients logit, which are
estimated from the full dataset. We consider a model of utility where consumer i receives
utility from choosing product j in market t of:
uijt = δjt + µijt + εijt. (2)
The parameter δjt is a product-speciﬁc intercept that captures the mean utility of product
j in market t, and µijt captures individual-speciﬁc correlation in tastes for products.
Nested Logit
In the case where (µijt + εijt) is distributed generalized extreme value, the error terms
allow for correlation among products within a pre-speciﬁed group, but otherwise assume no
correlation. This produces the well-known nested-logit model of McFadden (1978) and Train
(2003). In this model consumers ﬁrst choose a product category l composed of products gl,
and then choose a speciﬁc product j within that group. The resulting choice probability for









where the parameter λl governs within-group correlation, and at is the set of available prod-
ucts in market t.47
Random-coeﬃcients Logit
44The R2 from this regression is 0.66.
45The restrictions are that M must be at least 30 people per visit and must be greater than the total
vends for the machine-visit observation.
46The alternative model speciﬁes a daily rate of arrival. For each machine-visit observation we denote ∆t
as the elapsed time since the previous service visit in days and estimate a least-squares regession of yrv/∆t
on a series of machine ﬁxed eﬀects and a full set of 38 month*year dummies.
47Note that this is not the IV regression/“within-group share” presentation of the nested-logit model in
Berry (1994), in which σ provides a measure of the correlation of choices within a nest. Roughly speaking,
in the notation used here, λ = 1 corresponds to the plain logit, and (1 − λ) provides a measure of the
“correlation” of choices within a nest (as in McFadden (1978)). The parameter λ is sometimes referred to
as the “dissimiliarity parameter.”
16The random-coeﬃcients logit allows for correlation in tastes across observed product
characteristics.48 This correlation in tastes is captured by allowing the term µijt to be
distributed according to f(µijt|θ). A common speciﬁcation is to allow consumers to have
independent normally distributed tastes for product characteristics, so that µijt =
P
l σlνiltxjl
where νilt ∼ N(0,1) and σl represents the standard deviation of the heterogeneous taste for
product characteristic xjl. The resulting choice probabilities are a mixture over the logit












In both the nested-logit and random-coeﬃcient models δjt consists of product-site inter-
cepts.49 Thus, δjt allows the average taste for an individual product to vary from site to
site. For the nested-logit model, we allow for heterogeneous tastes across four major product
categories or nests: chocolate, cookie, energy, and salty snack.50 For the random-coeﬃcients
speciﬁcation, we allow for three random coeﬃcients, corresponding to consumer tastes for
salt, sugar, and fat.51 An observation for estimation groups machine visits into unique choice
sets of the 417 product-site pairs. We report and discuss the estimated parameter values
from these models in the section describing the results of the hold-out analyses.
5 Comparing Predicted and Nonparametric Results
Sales are predicted by both models at the machine-visit level using the estimated parameter
values and market size yrv. We describe the predicted vends during the treatment and
matched control weeks and compare them to the actual vends. This exercise does not predict
substitution patterns per se. Rather, it predicts vends in the environment of the treatment
weeks, and again in the environment of the control weeks. Thus, non-experimental changes
that occur during the control weeks are included in these predictions. There are two main
sources of these non-experimental changes. The ﬁrst is changes in the characteristics of other
48See Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
49These correspond to the 417 site-product pairs described in the data section
50The vending operator deﬁnes categories in the same way. “Candy” includes both chocolate and non-
chocolate candy items. “Energy” includes products such as peanuts, fruit rolls, crackers, and granola bars.
51We do not allow for a random coeﬃcient on price because of the relative lack of price variation in the
vending machines. We also do not include random coeﬃcients on any discrete variables (such as whether
or not a product contains chocolate). As we discuss in Conlon and Mortimer (2009), the lack of variation
in a continuous variable (e.g., price) implies that random coeﬃcients on categorical variables may not be
identiﬁed when product dummies are included in estimation. We did estimate a number of alternative
speciﬁcations in which we include random coeﬃcients on other continuous variables, such as carbohydrates.
In general, the additional parameters were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and they had no appreciable
eﬀect on the results of any prediction exercises.
17products (e.g., a manufacturer may change the fat content of its pretzels, or run a national
advertising campaign in a particular week). The second is changes in the availability of other
products (e.g., a manufacturer discontinues a particular product, or Mark Vend changes the
set of products it carries at a site). The models will adjust for these changes as well as
the removal of the focal product. In this sense, neither the nonparametric results nor the
predicted vends presented here can be interpreted as the “pure” treatment eﬀect of a product
removal.
5.1 Predicted and Actual Sales
Table 9 reports predicted vends from the nested-logit model during treatment and control
weeks next to the results of the nonparametric analyses for the Snickers experiment; table
10 repeats the exercise using the random-coeﬃcients logit model.52 Predicted vends for
the matched control weeks ﬁt well in both tables 9 and 10. While both demand models
will necessarily ﬁt average vends of all products quite closely (through the choice of the δjt
parameters), predictions for vends in the matched control weeks need not ﬁt well, because
both demand models are estimated oﬀ of the full dataset. In this sense, the predicted vends
for the matched control weeks provide some insight into the importance of week-to-week
variation in market shares in this setting.
Predicted vends ﬁt less well for the treatment weeks than for the matched control weeks.
Both models tend to predict more substitution to the outside good than the actual data
display: total predicted vends go down by roughly two percent, compared to only 0.1 percent
in the actual data. Table 9 shows how the predicted sales patterns in the nested-logit model
rely on the nesting structure speciﬁed for consumer tastes. Snickers is in the “candy” nest,
along with Twix Caramel, Peanut M&Ms, Assorted Chocolate, Assorted Candy, Raisinets,
and Skittles. Sales of all of these products are predicted to increase by eight to 17 percent
when Snickers is not available. Three of these products (Twix Caramel, Peanut M&Ms, and
Assorted Chocolate) are also identiﬁed as top substitutes in the nonparametric analyses.
Actual vends of Skittles were lower during the treatment weeks than during the matched
control weeks. However, it seems unlikely that Snickers is complementary to Skittles in
consumption, and the fact that the model does not predict lower sales of Skittles may
be viewed as a desirable feature. Assorted Potato Chips are predicted to have relatively
high sales during the treatment period. This results from changes in the set of products
included in the Assorted Potato Chip class at two individual sites.53 Two assorted product
classes (salty snack and cookie) are predicted by both models to have lower sales during the
treatment period compared to the matched control weeks; actual vends are also lower during
52Two full sets of 56 tables (one set for each model) are available in the online appendix. At the individual
site level, these tables also report changes in the availability of each product class, as well as any changes
to the inclusive value of the assorted product classes that occur between the treatment and control periods
due to changes in the individual products that comprise these classes. Further discussion is provided in the
online appendix.
53Less-popular brands of chips were stocked during the matched control weeks than during the treatment
weeks. The change is most noticeable at sites 5055 and 5655.
18the treatment period for these classes. This also results from changes in the component
products at individual sites: more-popular brands were carried during the matched control
weeks than during the treatment weeks.54 Relative to the nested-logit model, the random-
coeﬃcients model in table 10 predicts smoother sales patterns across product categories.
Thus, it successfully predicts more vends of cookie and energy products, which are closer to
Snickers in some of the observable product characteristics (i.e., fat and sugar).
5.2 Discussion of Predicted Sales
Both models tend to under-predict sales of the top substitutes, and over-predict sales to other
products. This may be explained partly by noise in the matched data, which we discussed
in section 3. However, another explanation is that the parametric models are misspeciﬁed.
We discuss two potential sources of misspeciﬁcation.
The ﬁrst potential source of misspeciﬁcation is that we have not chosen the correct form
for f(µijt|θ). For the nested-logit model, misspeciﬁcation is well understood, and occurs
when the pre-speciﬁed groupings of products that determine substitution patterns do not
fully capture consumer behavior. For example, the experiments suggest that many consumers
substitute from Snickers to Salted Peanuts, but Salted Peanuts also appear as a substitute
for Doritos. Since Doritos and Snickers do not display cross-substitution eﬀects with each
other, this creates a dilemma regarding the nest to which Salted Peanuts belong.
There may be several reasons why f(µijt|θ) is misspeciﬁed in the random-coeﬃcients
model: tastes may not be normally distributed for example, but the one most strongly sug-
gested by our experimental results is that there are omitted product characteristics for which
consumers have heterogeneous tastes. One example of an omitted characteristic might be
the presence of peanuts. This may help explain why the experimental results suggest there
is more substitution from Snickers bars to Peanut M&M’s and Salted Peanuts than the
model suggests. It also helps to explain why there is substantial substitution to packaged
peanuts during the Peanut M&M’s experiment, even though along other observable dimen-
sions, Peanut M&Ms and peanuts are not particularly similar. To formalize this intuition,
suppose that the true utility model is given by:
˜ uijt = δjt +
X
l
σlνiltxjl + γizjt + εijt γi ∼ N(0,σz) (5)
where zjt is an unobserved characteristic for which consumers have heterogenous tastes. One
can safely exclude the omitted characteristic only when σz = 0. There are two restrictions
that the parametric models of uijt impose. The ﬁrst is that correlation among tastes is
54The nested-logit model also predicts slightly lower vends during the treatment period for the assorted
energy product class, and for one individual product (Grandma’s Chocolate Chip Cookie). The latter
prediction is due to the absence of Grandma’s Chocolate Chip Cookie during the treatment period at one
site, and the fact that the nested-logit model does not predict much substitution from Snickers to the cookie
nest (so predicted vends at other sites do not increase very much). Detailed information on the eﬀects of
changes in the component products of the assorted classes, and the availability of all products, is included
in the full set of tables in the online appendix.
19parametrized by µijt, which is projected onto the space of observable characteristics xjt.55
This approach will always leave some residual correlation, unless the unrestricted J × J
matrix can be estimated. The second restriction is that, conditional on the consumer type
µijt, all substitution follows a standard logit, including the IIA (Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives) property. The random-coeﬃcients model is a mixture over many diﬀerent IIA
logit models. However, traces of the IIA property remain which may lead to underpredic-
tion of substitution to the best substitutes and overprediction of substitution to the worst
substitutes.56
The second source of diﬃculty for parametric models is that the set of available products
at is assumed to be exogenous to the decision-making process. In reality, ﬁrms choose
product mix carefully in order to maximize proﬁts. The endogeneity of the choice set (or
product mix) is something that the researcher cannot generally control, and it is precisely
this variation that is used to identify these models. This creates a challenge when we use the
models to extrapolate out of sample. For example, Snickers and Twix are both nearly always
in stock, and substitution between the two is identiﬁed in part by diﬀerences in observed
substitution to both products from a third product (such as Raisinets) which is sometimes,
but not always, stocked. The machines or time periods in which Raisinets are stocked are
chosen by Mark Vend to maximize proﬁts, and may reﬂect locations or times when the taste
for Raisinets is especially high. This leads the model to over-value Raisinets and to mis-
specify substitution between Snickers and Twix. The ability to exogenously alter choice sets
reduces our reliance on endogenous forms of choice-set variation, and allows us to test the
sensitivity of the models to the presence of exogenous variation, which we do in Section 7.
There is a third source of misspeciﬁcation that is more special to our setting, and that
is the absence of price variation.57 The ability to identify substitution patterns in the types
of demand models estimated here beneﬁts greatly from the presence of price variation, par-
ticularly when a strong instrument can be found for addressing the endogeneity of variation
in price.58
5.3 Predicted Proﬁt Impacts
Diﬀerences in predicted vends across products may not have much impact on ﬁrms’ bottom
lines, particularly in a setting with limited price variation. Table 11 reports the predicted
proﬁt diﬀerence for the downstream ﬁrm in the treatment vs. matched control weeks using
the random-coeﬃcients logit model. A comparison of the results to those in table 7 shows
that the change in the downstream ﬁrm’s average margin is predicted quite well, implying
55McFadden and Train (2000) show that any random utility model can be represented as a mixture of
logits as in (2). However, this depends on having a suﬃcient space of xjt’s.
56There are several approaches to dealing with these problems in the literature. One example is the pure
characteristics model of Berry and Pakes (2007) which avoids the logit error altogether. Another approach
is found in Bajari, Fox, Kim, and Ryan (2010) who try to non-parametrically recover f(µijt|θ).
57There are, however, many markets with limited price variation, and product availability is often a key
consideration in these contexts (e.g., movie theaters, iTunes, and subscription services such as Netﬂix).
58For a discussion of the role of price variation in identifying discrete-choice models of demand, see Acker-
berg and Rysman (2005), Berry and Haile (2008), and Fox and Gandhi (2010).
20that discrepencies between predicted and actual vends for individual products matters lit-
tle for the eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s average proﬁtability on a per-unit basis. Indeed, the most
important determinant for the change in Mark Vend’s average margin is the diﬀerence be-
tween the wholesale cost of the focal product compared to other goods: Snickers and Peanut
M&Ms have very high wholesale costs, and Mark Vend’s average margin increases when
those products are removed. The model predicts a more negative overall proﬁt impact for
each experiment relative to the non-parametric estimates, because total vends during the
treatment period are predicted to be lower than the actual data. However, the patterns are
correlated with those from the non-parametric analyses: the two most positive/least nega-
tive predicted diﬀerences correspond to the Peanut M&Ms and Snickers interventions, which
were also estimated to have the most positive impacts in the non-parametric results.
Table 12 reports the impact of the product removal on manufacturer revenue predicted
by the random-coeﬃcients model. Relative to the non-parametric estimates in table 8, some
experiments have predicted impacts that are quite similar (e.g., the cookie experiments),
while others predict a larger negative impact for the manufacturer of the focal product and
corresponding larger positive impacts for competing manufacturers. This reﬂects the fact
that many of the non-focal products with under-predicted sales are owned by the manu-
facturer of the focal product (e.g., both Snickers and Peanut M&Ms are owned by Mars
Inc.).
6 Simulating Stockout Events
The exercise in which we predict vends for the treatment and control weeks is an exercise in
which we are rarely interested from an economic point of view. Policy makers are generally
interested in understanding the impact of a control variable (in this case, the decision to
stock a product), rather than understanding the joint eﬀect of a control variable and other
factors. Both the non-parametric approach and the prediction exercise above conﬂates these
things, modeling the product removal simultaneously with changes in other factors that shift
consumer tastes (such as national manufacturer advertising campaigns). For that reason,
the prediction exercise is also a strenuous test on which to expect the models to perform
well, because of the need to adjust for multiple factors simultaneously. In this section, we
simulate the eﬀect of a product removal directly, using the estimated model parameters and
holding all other factors ﬁxed.
Both the nested logit and random-coeﬃcients logit speciﬁcations have straightforward
predictions regarding how demand should respond to a product removal. The expected










jt for the set of products available during the treatment weeks at each site.
Table 13 reports the results of this calculation for the Snickers removal, summing over all
sites.59 We choose Mt so that the sales levels of the focal product(s) match the sales levels in
59The full set of 56 tables is provided in the online appendix.
21the actual data during the matched control weeks. The left panel reports the change in sales
for a simulated removal of Snickers based on the nested logit and random-coeﬃcients logit
models. Under the random-coeﬃcients speciﬁcation, Snickers has sales of 323 units when
it is available. Of these 323 “Snickers consumers,” 73 leave the machine and 250 purchase
another product (e.g., 34 purchase an Assorted Energy product, 33 purchase Peanut M&Ms,
etc.). The downstream ﬁrm loses $69 in variable proﬁt from the sales of Snickers, but gains
$95 in variable proﬁt across all substitute goods. Thus, in spite of the fact that 73 Snickers
consumers leave the machine, the removal of Snickers is proﬁtable for the downstream ﬁrm.
Table 14 summarizes the overall proﬁt impacts of simulations in which we remove each
of the focal products. As expected, vends decreased in every case because of substitution
to the outside good. As in the nonparametric analyses and the prediction exercise, average
margins increase in the three candy removals as consumers substitute to products with lower
wholesale costs for the downstream ﬁrm. Mark Vend’s variable proﬁts increase when these
products are removed. The other product removals result in lower proﬁts for Mark Vend.
The revenue impacts for upstream ﬁrms are reported in table 15. The manufacturer of each
focal product loses revenue when the product is removed, while other manufacturers gain.
The gains to other manufacturers are spread out fairly widely.
7 Hold-out Analyses
In most applications, the type of exogenous variation in product availability that we induce
through our experiments does not exist in the data. Demand models are thus identiﬁed
entirely from naturally-occuring variation in choice sets. This variation may arise from
many sources (e.g., changes in stocking decisions, price, and other characteristics), but is
often endogenously determined by ﬁrms. Our setting permits us to examine the sensitivity
of our demand estimates to the presence of exogenous variation in choice sets.
Table 16 reports the estimated coeﬃcients that govern correlation in consumer tastes
when we estimate our demand models on subsets of the data that exclude diﬀerent sets of
our exogenous product removals. The random-coeﬃcients model is shown in the top panel,
and the nested logit model in the second panel. The bottom panel reports the number of
products and choice sets for each sample of the data. The parameter values from the base
model, in which the full set of data is used for estimation, are reported in the ﬁrst column.60
The second column reports the estimated parameters when the model is estimated on only
control observations (i.e., we exclude all experimental periods). The estimates of σsugar and
λcandy change signiﬁcantly (from 5.25 to 2.91 for σsugar and from 0.57 to 0.66 for λcandy). The
other parameters are more robust to the exclusion of the treatment observations. The third
column of table 16 reports the estimated parameters when the models are estimated without
the beneﬁt of the data from the candy experiments. We see the same eﬀect on the parameter
values: the estimated correlation in tastes for sugar and the candy nest are lower (i.e., σsugar
60The log likelihood values are reported in the last row of each panel. They are the same for both models,
but are not comparable across the diﬀerent hold-out sub-samples because they apply to a diﬀerent number
of observations.
22is lower and λcandy is higher).61 The remaining columns repeat the exercise by withholding
data from the salty snack and cookie experiments in turn. The estimated parameter values
are much more robust to these hold-out exercises.
The bottom panel provides some guidance for assessing these results. The total number
of products is reported next to each category name (e.g., there are 417 products total, 115
of which are candy products). The experimental interventions increase the total number of
unique choice sets from 1096 to 1734. Among candy products alone, there are 427 unique
choice sets in the full dataset, but only 262 in the subset of the data that includes only
control observations. The salty snack category has about 60 percent more products than
the candy category (187 vs. 115), but 120 percent more unique within-category choice sets
when using only the control observations (578 vs. 262). Removing data from the salty snack
interventions does reduce the number of within-category choice sets, but not as dramatically
(578 vs. 794).
The choice-set data help to better understand the challenges of identiﬁcation in demand
models when there is relatively little variation in stocking (or other product characteristics)
within a group of closely-related products. In our setting, the experimentally stocked-out
candy bars have large market shares relative to their salty-snack counterparts, and are nearly
always available simultaneously to consumers during the control observations. Furthermore,
there is limited variation (relative to the number of products) in consumer choice sets gener-
ated by other candy products. Thus, identifying correlation in tastes for the characteristics
that are important to these goods is greatly aided by our ability to exogenously create
choice-set variation.62
8 Conclusion
Our analysis of product availability makes use of a series of ﬁeld experiments in which top-
selling products are removed from a set of 60 vending machines. We analyze the substitution
patterns and proﬁt impacts in two ways: ﬁrst, using nonparametric techniques common to
the treatment eﬀects and experiments literature; second, using structural demand estimation.
We ﬁnd substitution patterns that seem quite sensible, and we note that in the short-run,
relatively few people leave the market when a product is out of stock. We ﬁnd evidence of
the incentive problems facing ﬁrms in vertically-separated markets: some product removals
result in lower revenues for upstream manufacturers but higher proﬁts for the downstream
vending operator when consumers substitute to products with lower wholesale costs.
We discuss the trade-oﬀs of both empirical approaches. The treatment-eﬀects approach
places no parametric restrictions on substitution patterns, but noisy estimates occasionally
imply nonsensical eﬀects of a product’s removal. The structural approach avoids this prob-
lem, but at the cost of imposing restrictions on the substitution patterns and proﬁt impacts
associated with a product’s removal. Using hold-out analyses, we ﬁnd that the structural
61Recall that the λ parameters give an indication of the ‘dissimilarity’ of products, so that a higher estimate
of λ indicates less substitution between two products within a nest.
62As discussed earlier, price variation will be helpful in many settings for generating additional variation
in the choice sets facing consumers.
23model is sensitive to the absence of the experimental data in parts of product space where
relatively little non-experimental variation occurs in consumers’ choice sets.
Product availability is a critical feature of many markets; ﬁrms make both long-run and
short-run decisions about the capacity or inventory of diﬀerent products to stock, which
brands to carry, and how to respond to changes in the product availability of rivals. Product
availability can vary over time due to mergers, foreclosure, or other factors. Despite the
prevalence of these issues, relatively little empirical evidence exists in the IO literature on
the importance of product stocking decisions for ﬁrm proﬁts, consumer choices, or vertical
relationships. Using vending machines, we are able to exogenously alter a ﬁrm’s product
mix in order to shed light on two central outcomes of interest (i.e., substitution patterns
and proﬁt impacts for both upstream and downstream ﬁrms), which apply broadly to more
complex settings. The experimental approach also provides an opportunity to compare the
trade-oﬀs and assess the sources of identiﬁcation of diﬀerent empirical methods.
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27Table 1: Manufacturer Ownership
Manufacturer
Hershey’s Kellogg Kraft Mars Inc. PepsiCo Snyder’s Minor
Data on Manufacturer Portfolios
Avg. Inside Good Share 3.36 12.74 4.76 21.11 33.20 8.97 0.93
Avg. Daily Sales per Machine 0.43 1.66 0.62 2.74 4.32 1.16 0.23
Avg. Products per Machine 1.56 5.22 2.77 5.72 10.48 2.80 1.24
# of Products 8 10 14 18 30 10 40
# Chocolate Products 4 0 0 10 0 0 6
# Candy Products 4 0 3 6 0 0 5
# Cookie Products 0 4 7 0 4 0 3
# Energy Products 0 5 4 2 3 0 8
# Salty Snack Products 0 1 0 0 23 10 18
Price Data for Individual Products
Price (Maximum) 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.95 1.00 2.00
Price (Median) 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.78
Price (Minimum) 0.75 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.45 0.50
Wholesale Price (Maximum) 0.57 0.49 0.40 0.67 0.49 0.77 0.77
Wholesale Price (Median) 0.46 0.28 0.28 0.53 0.33 0.23 0.33
Wholesale Price (Minimum) 0.38 0.15 0.16 0.38 0.15 0.14 0.02
Marketshare and Price Data for Individual Products, Based on Performance
Avg. Inside Share (Best) 5.39 5.33 5.00 6.63 5.85 6.55 5.34
Avg. Inside Share (Median) 1.76 2.48 1.64 1.98 2.93 3.40 1.76
Avg. Inside Share (Worst) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.04 1.72 0.03
Price (Best) 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.75
Price (Median) 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.75
Price (Worst) 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.60 0.75 0.60 0.75
Wholesale Price (Best) 0.49 0.39 0.27 0.54 0.23 0.21 0.44
Wholesale Price (Median) 0.49 0.24 0.32 0.54 0.34 0.32 0.02
Wholesale Price (Worst) 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.22 0.47
Notes: All calculations performed using the full dataset from Mark Vend Company at six exper-
imental sites. There are 17 minor manufacturers: Barton’s Confectioners, Biscomerica, Brother’s
Kane, California Chips, ConAgra, Farley’s & Sathers Candy Company, Frontera Foods, General
Mills, Genisoy, Inventure Group, Just Born Inc., Kar’s Nuts, Nestle, Procter & Gamble, Sherwood
Brands, Snak King, and United Natural Foods. The second panel, “Price data for individual prod-
ucts,” ranks products by the reported variable. The third panel ranks products based on their
average inside market share and reports statistics for all variables based on this ranking.
28Table 2: List of Products Used for Matching at Each Site
Candy and Choc Chip Famous Amos Experiments
93 Ass. Pretzels, Cheetos, Doritos, Ass. Potato Chips
5055 Cheetos, Doritos
5655 Doritos, Ass. Potato Chips
6056 Ass. Pretzels, Cheetos, Doritos, Ass. Salty Snack
6263 Ass. Pretzels, Cheetos
7277 Ass. Pretzels, Cheetos, Doritos, Ass. Potato Chips, Ass. Salty Snack
Salty Snack Experiments
93 Ass. Candy, Ass. Chocolate, Raisinets
5055 Raisinets, Twix
5655 Ass. Candy, Ass. Chocolate, Twix
6056 Ass. Candy, Skittles, Twix
6263 Skittles, Twix
7277 Ass. Candy, Ass. Chocolate, Raisinets
Zoo Animal Cracker Experiment
93 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips, Ass. Salty Snack
5055 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips
5655 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips
6056 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips, Ass. Salty Snack
6263 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips, Ass. Salty Snack
7277 Ass. Pretzels, Ass. Potato Chips
Notes: Candy experiments are Snickers, Peanut M&Ms, and the joint removal of both. Salty Snack
experiments are Doritos, Cheetos, and the joint removal of both.
29Table 3: Substitution Patterns for Snickers Experiment, All Sites
Control Control Treatment Treatment Mean
Product Mean %ile Mean %ile Diﬀerence % ∆
Vends
Peanut M&Ms 359.9 73.6 478.3 99.4 118.4 32.9
Twix Caramel 187.6 55.3 297.1 100.0 109.5 58.4
Assorted Chocolate 334.8 66.7 398.0 95.0 63.2 18.9
Assorted Energy 571.9 63.5 616.2 76.7 44.3 7.8
Zoo Animal Cracker 209.1 78.6 243.7 98.1 34.6 16.5
Salted Peanuts 187.9 70.4 216.3 93.7 28.4 15.1
Choc Chip Famous Amos 171.6 71.7 193.1 95.0 21.5 12.5
Ruger Vanilla Wafer 107.3 59.7 127.9 78.6 20.6 19.1
Assorted Candy 215.8 43.4 229.6 60.4 13.7 6.4
Assorted Potato Chips 279.6 64.2 292.4 66.7 12.8 4.6
Assorted Pretzels 548.3 87.4 557.7 88.7 9.4 1.7
Raisinets 133.3 66.0 139.4 74.2 6.1 4.6
Cheetos 262.2 60.1 260.5 58.2 -1.8 -0.7
Grandmas Choc Chip 77.9 51.3 72.5 37.8 -5.4 -7.0
Doritos 215.4 54.1 203.1 39.6 -12.3 -5.7
Assorted Cookie 180.3 61.0 162.4 48.4 -17.9 -10.0
Skittles 100.1 62.9 75.1 30.2 -25.1 -25.0
Assorted Salty Snack 1382.8 56.0 1276.2 23.3 -106.7 -7.7
Snickers 323.4 50.3 2.0 1.3 -321.4 -99.4
Total 5849.6 74.2 5841.3 73.0 -8.3 -0.1
Shares
Peanut M&Ms 6.2 60.4 8.2 100.0 2.0 33.1
Twix Caramel 3.2 41.5 5.1 96.9 1.9 58.6
Assorted Chocolate 5.7 53.5 6.8 96.9 1.1 19.0
Assorted Energy 9.8 49.1 10.5 75.5 0.8 7.9
Zoo Animal Cracker 3.6 65.4 4.2 98.1 0.6 16.7
Salted Peanuts 3.2 56.6 3.7 89.9 0.5 15.3
Choc Chip Famous Amos 2.9 64.8 3.3 90.6 0.4 12.7
Ruger Vanilla Wafer 1.8 51.6 2.2 74.8 0.4 19.3
Assorted Candy 3.7 35.8 3.9 49.7 0.2 6.5
Assorted Potato Chips 4.8 62.9 5.0 63.5 0.2 4.7
Assorted Pretzels 9.4 75.5 9.5 82.4 0.2 1.9
Raisinets 2.3 58.5 2.4 67.9 0.1 4.7
Cheetos 4.5 38.0 4.5 36.1 -0.0 -0.5
Grandmas Choc Chip 1.3 39.7 1.2 23.1 -0.1 -6.8
Doritos 3.7 37.7 3.5 20.8 -0.2 -5.6
Assorted Cookie 3.1 55.3 2.8 44.0 -0.3 -9.8
Skittles 1.7 56.6 1.3 20.1 -0.4 -24.9
Assorted Salty Snack 23.6 32.7 21.8 4.4 -1.8 -7.6
Snickers 5.5 44.0 0.0 0.6 -5.5 -99.4
Total 100.0 50.3 100.0 50.3 0.0 0.0
Notes: Control weeks are selected through nearest-neighbor matching using four control observa-
tions for each treatment week. Percentiles are relative to the full distribution of control weeks.
30Table 4: Top 5 Substitutes (Based on Change in Sales), All Experiments
Candy Experiments
Focal Product: Snickers Peanut M&Ms Snickers +
Peanut M&Ms
Top 5 Peanut M&Ms Snickers Twix Caramel
Substitutes: Twix Caramel Plain M&Ms Plain M&Ms
Ass. Chocolate Twix Caramel Ass. Chocolate
Ass. Energy Salted Peanuts Raisinets
Zoo Animal Cracker Raisinets Ass. Cookie
Eﬀects: Focal (-321.4) Focal (-317.7) Focals (-287.6,-305.9)
Top 5 (+370.0) Top 5 (+265.2) Top 5 (+305.5)
Total (-8.3) Total (+54.1) Total (-218.4)
Salty Snack Experiments
Focal Product: Doritos Cheetos Doritos +
Cheetos
Top 5 Ass. Potato Chips Sun Chips Ass. Salty Snack
Substitutes: Peanut M&Ms Ass. Potato Chips Ass. Energy
Salted Peanuts Ass. Energy Snickers
Sun Chips Frito Cheez-It Original
Ass. Energy Salted Peanuts Hot Stuﬀ Jays
Eﬀects: Focal (-210.6) Focal (-273.2) Focals (-172.7,-215.5)
Top 5 (+183.6) Top 5 (+284.6) Top 5 (+324.1)
Total (-75.1) Total (-122.5) Total (-35.9)
Cookie Experiments
Focal Product: Zoo Animal Crackers Choc Chip Famous Amos
Top 5 Peanut M&M Sun Chips
Substitutes: Ass. Energy Salted Peanuts
Snickers Ass. Potato Chips
Twix Caramel Raspberry Knotts
Ruger Vanilla Wafer Grandma Choc Chip
Eﬀects: Focal (-210.6) Focal (-141.6)
Top 5 (+216.8) Top 5 (+155.7)
Total (-28.7) Total (-179.5)
Notes: Control weeks are selected through nearest-neighbor matching using four control
observations for each treatment week. Eﬀects report the change in average vends of the
treatment and control weeks for: the focal product, the Top 5 substitutes based on changes
in sales levels, and total vends.
31Table 5: Top 5 Substitutes (Based on Percentage Change in Own Sales), All Experiments
Candy Experiments
Focal Product: Snickers Peanut M&Ms Snickers +
Peanut M&Ms
Top 5 Twix Caramel Plain M&Ms Plain M&Ms
Substitutes: Peanut M&Ms Snickers Twix Caramel
Ruger Vanilla Wafer Raisinets Ass. Chocolate
Ass. Chocolate Farleys Mixed Fruit Raisinets
Zoo Animal Crackers Salted Peanuts Reeses Peanut Butter Cups
Eﬀects: Focal (-5.5%) Focal (-5.9%) Focal (-5.4%,-5.7%)
Top 5 (+6.0%) Top 5 (+4.5%) Top 5 (+6.4%)
Total (-0.1%) Total (+1.0%) Total (-4.1%)
Salty Snack Experiments
Focal Products: Doritos Cheetos Doritos +
Cheetos
Top 5 Salted Peanuts Sun Chips Hot Stuﬀ Jays
Substitutes: Ass. Potato Chips Frito Cheez-It Original
Sun Chips Salted Peanuts Frito
Peanut M&Ms Ass. Potato Chips Ass. Salty Snack
Choc Chip F A Doritos Smartfood
Eﬀects: Focal (-3.6%) Focal (-4.6%) Focal (-3.5%,-4.4%)
Top 5 (+3.3%) Top 5 (+4.8%) Top 5 (+5.9%)
Total (-1.2%) Total (-2.1%) Total (-0.7%)
Cookie Experiments
Focal Products: Zoo Animal Crackers Choc Chip Famous Amos
Top 5 Ruger Vanilla Wafer Sun Chips
Substitutes: Raspberry Knotts Salted Peanuts
Twix Caramel Raspberry Knotts
Peanut M&Ms Grandma Choc Chip
Snickers Ass. Potato Chips
Eﬀects: Focal (-3.4%) Focal (-2.5%)
Top 5 (+3.0%) Top 5 (+3.2%)
Total (-0.5%) Total (-3.2%)
Notes: Control weeks are selected through nearest-neighbor matching using four control
observations for each treatment week. Eﬀects report the change in average vends of the
treatment and control weeks for: the focal product, the Top 5 substitutes based on percentage
changes in sales levels, and total vends. Percentage changes for Focal and Top 5 products
refer to changes in their average inside market share. Percentage change for Total reports
the percentage change in the number of total vends.
32Table 6: Impact of Snickers Experiment on Downstream Firm Proﬁt, All Sites
Retail Diﬀerence Diﬀerence
Product Manufacturer Margin in Vends in Revenue
Peanut M&Ms Mars 0.21 118.4 25.2
Twix Caramel Mars 0.21 109.5 23.3
Assorted Chocolate Hershey’s / Mars / Other 0.25 63.2 13.2
Assorted Energy Variousa 0.48 44.3 17.6
Zoo Animal Cracker Kellogg’s 0.52 34.6 17.6
Salted Peanuts Kraft 0.49 28.4 13.2
Choc Chip Famous Amos Kellogg’s 0.53 21.5 12.7
Ruger Vanilla Wafer Other 0.50 20.6 10.5
Assorted Candy Variousb 0.41 13.7 5.9
Assorted Potato Chips PepsiCo 0.35 12.8 4.7
Assorted Pretzels Snyder’s / PepsiCo 0.38 9.4 1.6
Raisinets Other 0.31 6.1 1.9
Cheetos PepsiCo 0.41 -1.8 -0.7
Grandmas Choc Chip PepsiCo 0.59 -5.4 -3.4
Doritos PepsiCo 0.41 -12.3 -5.0
Assorted Cookie Variousc 0.48 -17.9 -10.3
Skittles Mars 0.21 -25.1 -5.2
Assorted Salty Snack Variousd 0.41 -106.7 -51.6
Snickers Mars 0.21 -321.4 -68.4
Total 0.38 -8.3 2.6
Notes: Retail margin is reported in cents per unit. Diﬀerence in vends is reported in units
per week, and diﬀerence in revenue is reported in dollars per week.
aOther / Kellogg / Kraft / Mars / PepsiCo
bOther / Hershey’s / Kellogg’s / Mars
cKellogg’s / Kraft / PepsiCo / Other
dMars / Snyder’s / PepsiCo / Other / Kellogg’s
33Table 7: Impact of All Experiments on Total Downstream Firm Proﬁt
Diﬀerence in:
Experiment Vends Margin Proﬁt
Snickers -8.27 0.02 2.65
Animal Crackers -28.68 -0.80 -60.40
Doritos -75.08 -0.48 -53.64
Peanut M&Ms 54.13 0.47 43.78
Cheetos -122.49 -0.16 -55.06
Choc Chip Famous Amos -179.47 -0.34 -89.21
Cheetos + Doritos -35.93 -0.21 -12.76
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms -218.37 1.21 -15.00
Notes: Diﬀerence in margin is reported in cents per unit. Diﬀerence in vends is reported in
units per week, and diﬀerence in proﬁts is reported in dollars per week.
Table 8: Impact on Manufacturer Revenue
Manufacturer
Experiment Hershey’s Kellogg Kraft Mars Inc. PepsiCo Snyder’s Minor
Snickers -5.07 16.63 5.52 -27.72 14.15 -26.26 26.18
Animal Crackers -4.68 -41.09 5.54 82.28 28.52 -20.98 11.52
Doritos -3.82 11.61 11.85 41.40 -19.30 -31.86 0.87
Peanut M&Ms -1.52 7.92 3.97 -50.34 53.63 -4.13 24.54
Cheetos 0.76 1.65 8.92 13.58 19.53 -29.27 -20.63
Choc Chip Famous Amos -9.34 -51.94 12.37 3.34 67.07 -32.25 -16.67
Cheetos + Doritos 11.73 11.83 -0.60 11.97 -46.91 4.23 1.11
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms 45.10 25.03 7.04 -220.52 3.78 -9.67 40.49
Notes: Revenues to manufacturer are calculated as the wholesale cost paid by Mark Vend
to the manufacturer, not including any potential rebate payments. Revenue impacts for the
manufacturer of the focal product of any given experiment are shown in bold typeface (e.g.,
Mars Inc. manufactures Snickers). Minor manufacturers include all 17 manufacturers listed
in table 1.
34Table 9: Predicted Sales During the Snickers Treatment and Matched Control Weeks (All
Sites), Nested Logit Model
Actual Values (Means) Fitted Values (Means)
Treatment Control %∆ Treatment Control %∆
Twix Caramel 297.1 187.6 58.4 208.6 190.7 9.4
Peanut M&Ms 478.3 359.9 32.9 388.6 349.1 11.3
Ruger Vanilla Wafer 127.9 107.3 19.1 114.3 111.5 2.5
Assorted Chocolate 398.0 334.8 18.9 371.0 328.6 12.9
Zoo Animal Cracker 243.7 209.1 16.5 206.9 205.2 0.8
Salted Peanuts 216.3 187.9 15.1 190.7 184.8 3.2
Choc Chip Famous Amos 193.1 171.6 12.5 171.4 167.5 2.4
Assorted Energy 616.2 571.9 7.8 582.7 584.3 -0.3
Assorted Candy 229.6 215.8 6.4 253.1 217.0 16.6
Raisinets 139.4 133.3 4.6 142.8 129.5 10.3
Assorted Potato Chips 292.4 279.6 4.6 348.4 290.9 19.8
Assorted Pretzels 557.7 548.3 1.7 533.2 522.4 2.1
Cheetos 260.5 262.2 -0.7 271.8 270.1 0.6
Doritos 203.1 215.4 -5.7 229.3 226.5 1.3
Grandmas Choc Chip 72.5 77.9 -7.0 83.7 83.9 -0.3
Assorted Salty Snack 1276.2 1382.8 -7.7 1356.3 1410.5 -3.8
Assorted Cookie 162.4 180.3 -10.0 162.5 178.4 -8.9
Skittles 75.1 100.1 -25.0 100.3 93.2 7.6
Snickers 2.0 323.4 -99.4 4.4 336.2 -98.7
Total 5841.3 5849.6 -0.1 5719.9 5880.2 -2.7
Notes: Products are sorted by percentage change in actual values. Predicted results report
sales during the treatment weeks and control weeks using the parameters estimated in the
baseline nested-logit model. Just as for the actual data, predicted vends of the focal product
result from the assignment of service visits to weeks.
35Table 10: Predicted Sales During the Snickers Treatment and Matched Control Weeks (All
Sites), Random Coeﬃcients Model
Actual Values (Means) Fitted Values (Means)
Treatment Control %∆ Treatment Control %∆
Twix Caramel 297.1 187.6 58.4 206.2 189.8 8.7
Peanut M&Ms 478.3 359.9 32.9 382.4 347.9 9.9
Ruger Vanilla Wafer 127.9 107.3 19.1 120.7 110.2 9.5
Assorted Chocolate 398.0 334.8 18.9 367.7 327.6 12.2
Zoo Animal Cracker 243.7 209.1 16.5 211.8 204.3 3.7
Salted Peanuts 216.3 187.9 15.1 193.8 183.9 5.4
Choc Chip Famous Amos 193.1 171.6 12.5 178.9 165.9 7.9
Assorted Energy 616.2 571.9 7.8 604.6 579.6 4.3
Assorted Candy 229.6 215.8 6.4 246.0 217.9 12.9
Raisinets 139.4 133.3 4.6 138.7 129.4 7.2
Assorted Potato Chips 292.4 279.6 4.6 349.6 289.8 20.6
Assorted Pretzels 557.7 548.3 1.7 525.7 519.4 1.2
Cheetos 260.5 262.2 -0.7 264.6 266.4 -0.7
Doritos 203.1 215.4 -5.7 229.6 225.5 1.8
Grandmas Choc Chip 72.5 77.9 -7.0 90.5 83.2 8.7
Assorted Salty Snack 1276.2 1382.8 -7.7 1353.1 1403.2 -3.6
Assorted Cookie 162.4 180.3 -10.0 169.1 178.5 -5.2
Skittles 75.1 100.1 -25.0 97.7 92.9 5.1
Snickers 2.0 323.4 -99.4 4.4 334.1 -98.7
Total 5841.3 5849.6 -0.1 5735.1 5849.6 -2.0
Notes: Products are sorted by percentage change in actual values. Predicted results report
sales during the treatment weeks and control weeks using the parameters estimated in the
baseline random-coeﬃcients logit model. Just as for the actual data, predicted vends of the
focal product result from the assignment of service visits to weeks.
36Table 11: Impact of All Experiments on Total Downstream Firm Proﬁt (Predicted, RC
Logit)
Diﬀerence in:
Experiment Vends Margin Proﬁt
Snickers -114.46 0.45 -15.82
Animal Crackers -152.71 -0.85 -109.71
Doritos -193.68 -0.48 -98.08
Peanut M&Ms -82.42 0.69 1.70
Cheetos -205.94 -0.19 -94.33
Choc Chip Famous Amos -243.73 -0.52 -130.73
Cheetos + Doritos -187.34 -0.06 -74.43
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms -369.02 1.98 -33.76
Notes: Diﬀerence in margin is reported in cents per unit. Diﬀerence in vends is reported in
units per week, and diﬀerence in proﬁts is reported in dollars per week.
Table 12: Impact on Manufacturer Revenue (Predicted, RC Logit)
Manufacturer
Experiment Hershey’s Kellogg Kraft Mars Inc. PepsiCo Snyder’s Minor
Snickers -0.18 10.46 9.33 -109.08 41.52 -19.70 2.54
Animal Crackers -1.19 -49.44 6.15 43.09 44.73 -19.02 -27.52
Doritos -6.39 3.74 13.95 31.28 -16.68 -31.36 -26.42
Peanut M&Ms 3.95 9.95 9.48 -96.56 49.02 -18.13 12.46
Cheetos -6.83 -0.65 17.13 17.29 -10.67 -31.69 -36.35
Choc Chip Famous Amos -9.52 -48.99 6.01 30.75 13.51 -30.69 -17.96
Cheetos + Doritos 11.60 1.69 6.46 2.01 -81.60 2.24 -2.67
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms 26.45 16.53 8.22 -291.40 19.39 -10.53 29.21
Notes: Revenues to manufacturer are calculated as the wholesale cost paid by Mark Vend
to the manufacturer, not including any potential rebate payments. Revenue impacts for the
manufacturer of the focal product of any given experiment are shown in bold typeface (e.g.,
Mars Inc. manufactures Snickers). Minor manufacturers include all 17 manufacturers listed
in table 1.
37Table 13: Simulated Eﬀects of Removing Snickers (All Sites)
Change in Sales Change in Proﬁt
Nested Logit RC Logit Nested Logit RC Logit
Peanut M&Ms 39.35 32.87 8.37 6.99
Assorted Chocolate 34.96 29.73 10.14 8.47
Assorted Candy 24.20 16.16 10.45 6.96
Twix Caramel 16.47 16.38 3.50 3.48
Raisinets 10.78 8.14 3.34 2.52
Skittles 10.29 10.51 1.89 1.98
Assorted Salty Snack 10.02 27.67 4.11 11.31
Assorted Energy 4.52 34.35 2.20 16.57
Assorted Pretzels 3.29 7.61 1.24 2.88
Cheetos 1.85 4.80 0.76 1.97
Doritos 1.53 4.65 0.63 1.91
Assorted Potato Chips 1.43 3.70 0.53 1.37
Assorted Cookie 1.41 12.31 0.65 5.59
Zoo Animal Cracker 1.36 8.89 0.69 4.43
Choc Chip Famous Amos 1.12 12.13 0.61 6.53
Grandmas Choc Chip 0.67 12.00 0.39 7.02
Ruger Vanilla Wafer 0.63 8.03 0.34 4.33
Salted Peanuts 0.10 0.42 0.06 0.23
Snickers -320.00 -323.42 -68.06 -68.79
Total -156.02 -73.11 -18.18 25.77
Notes: The left panel reports the change in sales for each product of a simulated removal of
Snickers. The simulated proﬁt change of each product for the downstream ﬁrm is reported
in the right panel.
38Table 14: Simulated Eﬀects of Stockouts on Retailer Proﬁt (Random Coeﬃcients)
Diﬀerence in:
Experiment Vends Margin Proﬁt
Snickers -73.11 0.98 25.77
Animal Crackers -106.88 -0.48 -70.42
Doritos -104.03 -0.05 -43.07
Peanut M&Ms -113.89 1.08 8.48
Cheetos -72.34 -0.01 -28.74
Choc Chip Famous Amos -50.20 -0.48 -43.84
Cheetos + Doritos -153.59 -0.04 -61.81
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms -189.36 2.24 39.22
Notes: Diﬀerence in margin is reported in cents per unit. Diﬀerence in vends is reported in
units, and diﬀerence in proﬁts is reported in dollars.
Table 15: Simulated Eﬀects of Stockouts on Manufacturer Revenue (Random Coeﬃcients)
Manufacturer
Hershey’s Kellogg Kraft Mars PepsiCo Snyder’s Minor
Snickers 3.55 12.82 3.74 -132.67 13.70 2.31 18.06
Animal Crackers 1.24 -46.43 1.87 15.45 7.64 2.31 6.93
Doritos 0.78 4.62 1.71 7.11 -59.26 2.46 5.26
Peanut M&Ms 3.31 8.41 3.35 -135.83 10.75 1.75 15.54
Cheetos 0.89 8.86 3.05 9.28 -65.59 3.68 9.91
Choc Chip Famous Amos 1.24 -36.23 1.31 15.44 8.22 1.40 5.61
Cheetos + Doritos 1.50 11.32 4.41 14.04 -109.23 5.64 13.40
Snickers + Peanut M&Ms 7.03 23.23 7.27 -283.18 25.72 4.45 37.46
Notes: Revenues to manufacturer are calculated as the wholesale cost paid by Mark Vend
to the manufacturer, not including any potential rebate payments. Revenue impacts for the
manufacturer of the focal product of any given experiment are shown in bold typeface (e.g.,
Mars Inc. manufactures Snickers). Minor manufacturers include all 17 manufacturers listed
in table 1.
39Table 16: Parameter Estimates and Holdout Analyses
Base Model Hold Out Experimental Data from:
All Candy Salty Animal Choc Chip
Experiments Snack Crackers F. Amos
Random Coeﬃcients
σfat 2.10 (0.091) 2.42 2.39 2.06 2.17 2.14
σsalt 3.49 (0.179) 3.93 4.65 3.21 3.47 3.52
σsugar 5.25 (0.281) 2.91 2.94 5.44 5.08 5.11
LL ∗ 106 -5.206 -4.259 -4.806 -4.861 -5.101 -5.111
Nested Logit
λcandy 0.57 (0.013) 0.66 0.65 0.57 0.58 0.58
λcookie 0.72 (0.021) 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.72
λenergy 0.86 (0.015) 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.86
λsaltysnack 0.62 (0.020) 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.61
LL ∗ 106 -5.206 -4.259 -4.806 -4.861 -5.101 -5.111
Number of Choice Sets
All (417) 1734 1096 1485 1586 1674 1653
Candy (115) 427 262 265 425 427 427
Cookie (53) 184 122 184 184 152 154
Energy (62) 166 166 166 166 166 166
Salty Snack (187) 794 578 792 582 794 793
Notes: Base model is estimated oﬀ the full dataset, including all experimental periods. Candy
excludes data from the Snickers, Peanut M&M’s, and joint Snickers/Peanut M&M Exper-
iments. Salty Snack excludes data from the Cheetos, Doritos, and joint Doritos/Cheetos
Experiments. The third panel reports the number of products in each category in paren-
theses after the category name. The number of unique choice sets is reported in the row
labeled “All.” The number of choice sets by category is calculated for the products within
the category. Category-level choice sets do not sum to the total number of choice sets be-
cause variation in choice sets across categories contributes to the total number of choice sets.
Standard errors for the base model estimates are reported in parentheses.
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